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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
The state appeals from the district court’s order suppressing evidence. The state
contends that information that Jennie Lynn Pylican entered and then left a fenced storage
facility well after business hours created reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
Deputy Geisel was on patrol at around midnight when he saw a Mazda car approach
the Trust Storage Facility. (3/21/18 Tr., p. 29, L. 13 – p. 35, L. 6.) The business hours of
the storage facility were 8:00 a.m. to 10:00 p.m. (3/21/18 Tr., p. 24, L. 25 – p. 25, L. 24.)
The entrance had a coded gate. (3/21/18 Tr., p. 25, L. 25 – p. 26, L. 8.) Deputy Geisel had
driven past that facility after it was closed hundreds of times in the year that the facility
had been in existence and had never seen anyone inside. (3/21/18 Tr., p. 24, L. 25 – p. 25,
L. 14; p. 28, L. 8 – p. 29, L. 1.) He had seen people trying to access the facility after hours,
but they had been unable to do so. (3/21/18 Tr., p. 29, Ls. 1-12.) The area around the
storage facility is “probably one of our worst areas for vehicle thefts and residential thefts.”
(3/21/18 Tr., p. 39, Ls. 16-25.) Deputy Geisel testified that he would “[a]bsolutely” be
concerned about the presence of people at a business after hours because it may involve
theft or other criminal activity. (3/21/18 Tr., p. 27, L. 24 – p. 28, L. 7.)
Deputy Geisel drove toward the facility and saw the gate closing and the Mazda
inside. (3/21/18 Tr., p. 36, L. 14 – p. 37, L. 3.) When he realized the car had entered the
facility, Deputy Geisel called in backup. (3/21/18 Tr., p. 35, Ls. 2-6.) After backup arrived,
about 15 minutes later, officers approached and saw a blue truck also inside the storage
facility. (3/21/18 Tr., p. 38, L. 17 – p. 39, L. 14.) The officers intended to ask the people
1

what they were doing inside the storage facility after hours. (3/21/18 Tr., p. 39, Ls. 9-20.)
When they got to the gate they saw people entering the Mazda car and the truck. (3/21/18
Tr., p. 40, Ls. 10-21.) The officers elected to get back in their police cars and follow the
vehicles once they exited. (3/21/18 Tr., p. 40, L. 22 – p. 41, L. 12.) When the Mazda
exited at about 12:30, Deputy Geisel followed it and stopped it. (3/21/18 Tr., p. 41, L. 13
– p. 43, L. 19.)
Jennie Pylican was the driver of the Mazda. (3/21/18 Tr., p. 43, L. 20 – p. 45, L.
5.) Deputy Geisel informed Pylican the reasons for the stop were a signal violation and for
“being in the storage facility after hours.” (3/21/18 Tr., p. 45, Ls. 6-14; ----see also 11/15/17
Tr., p. 7, Ls. 7-13.) In regard to the latter, Pylican asserted that she and her husband were
“moving from one unit to another” and that they had entered the storage facility “prior to
10:00 p.m.” and that, although she could not use the code to get in after hours, she was
allowed to stay in the facility after closing as long as she entered before closing. (3/21/18
Tr., p.45, Ls. 15-21; p. 45, L. 25 – p. 46, L. 6; State’s Exhibit 2 at 00:50-01:18.) Deputy
Geisel did not believe her claim of having entered the storage facility before 10:00 p.m.
because he witnessed her car enter at just before midnight. (3/21/18 Tr., p. 45, Ls. 22-24;
p. 46, Ls. 7-9.)
Deputy Geisel had Pylican and her passenger step from the vehicle to investigate
possible criminal activity at the storage facility. (3/21/18 Tr., p. 46, L. 21 – p. 48, L. 20.)
While Deputy Geisel was doing this, another deputy conducted an open-air dog sniff
around the car. (3/21/18 Tr., p. 47, Ls. 2-4; p. 48, Ls. 21-25.) The drug dog alerted on the
car, and the officer found methamphetamine paraphernalia. (11/15/17 Tr., p. 31, L. 13 –
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p. 32, L. 3.) The warrants check on Pylican’s passenger also revealed a warrant for her
arrest. (3/21/18 Tr., p. 49, Ls. 1-15.)
The state charged Pylican with possession of methamphetamine and possession of
paraphernalia. (R., pp. 19-20.) She moved to suppress evidence, contending she was
seized without legal justification. (R., pp. 26-38, 44-46.) The state objected to the motion,
contending there was reasonable suspicion for the detention and that the discovery of the
arrest warrant on the passenger would have inevitably extended the stop. (R., pp. 40-42.)
The district court granted the suppression motion. (R., p. 74.) The district court
concluded that there was reasonable suspicion to stop Pylican for failing to signal but the
officer lacked reasonable suspicion related to being in the storage facility after business
hours. (3/22/18 Tr., p. 13, Ls. 1-10; p. 17, Ls. 16-20.) Therefore, the officer unreasonably
extended the stop by investigating why Pylican was in the storage facility after hours in
addition to the traffic offense. (3/22/18 Tr., p. 17, L. 20 – p. 18, L. 24.) The state filed a
notice of appeal within 42 days of the filing of the order granting suppression. (R., pp. 7779.)
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ISSUES
1.
Did the district court err when it concluded that Deputy Geisel lacked reasonable
suspicion to investigate why Pylican entered a storage facility two hours after it closed?
2.
Did the district court err in its alternate holding that Deputy Geisel unreasonably
expanded the scope of the stop by having Pylican exit the car?

4

ARGUMENT
I.
Deputy Geisel Had Reasonable Suspicion To Investigate Why Pylican Entered A Storage
Facility Two Hours After It Closed
A.

Introduction
The district court concluded that Deputy Geisel lacked reasonable suspicion to

investigate why Pylican entered a storage facility two hours after it closed. Application of
the relevant law to the facts of this case shows the district court erred.

B.

Standard Of Review
“Determinations of reasonable suspicion are reviewed de novo.” State v. Morgan,

154 Idaho 109, 111, 294 P.3d 1121, 1123 (2013). “On review of a suppression motion
ruling, this Court will accept the district court’s findings unless they are clearly erroneous.”
State v. Danney, 153 Idaho 405, 410, 283 P.3d 722, 727 (2012).

C.

Pylican’s Entry Into And Presence At The Storage Facility Two Hours After It
Closed Merited An Investigative Detention
“An investigatory stop must be justified by some objective manifestation that the

person stopped is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal activity.” United States v. Cortez,
449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981). “[T]he Fourth Amendment is satisfied if the officer’s action is
supported by reasonable suspicion to believe that criminal activity ‘may be afoot.’” United
States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1,
7 (1989)). The court must “look at the ‘totality of the circumstances’ of each case to see
whether the detaining officer has a ‘particularized and objective basis’ for suspecting legal
wrongdoing.” Id. (quoting Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417-18). “Although an officer’s reliance
on a mere ‘hunch’ is insufficient to justify a stop, the likelihood of criminal activity need
5

not rise to the level required for probable cause, and it falls considerably short of satisfying
a preponderance of the evidence standard.” Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27
(1968)). “The Fourth Amendment requires some minimal level of objective justification
for making the stop.” Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7. Furthermore, reasonable suspicion “need
not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct.” Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 277.
Here Deputy Geisel was working on far more than a “hunch.” He witnessed enough
to reasonably believe that Pylican had entered the storage facility at a time when she had
no legitimate right to be there. The owners had taken steps to keep people out of the facility
after 10:00, including posting the hours and coding the gate, but Pylican entered at about
midnight. This raised the reasonable suspicion that she may be there for illegitimate,
criminal reasons such as burglary or theft. Applying the law to the facts of this case shows
that it was not only reasonable, but desirable, for Deputy Geisel to find out if Pylican’s
entry into a closed storage business was for criminal or legitimate purposes.
In holding to the contrary, the district court repeatedly emphasized that the evidence
did not exclude innocent explanations of Pylican’s conduct. (See, e.g., 3/22/18 Tr., p. 13,
Ls. 11-25 (people stating gate codes did not work after hours “could certainly have been
lying”); p. 14, Ls. 1-9 (court cannot conclude that being in storage facility after hours
“necessarily means” Pylican lacked permission to be there); p. 14, Ls. 10-21 (sometimes
businesses allow customers to stay after closing to finish business); p. 14, L. 22 – p. 15, L.
6 (one “reasonable conclusion” was that the blue truck “was in there before 10:00 o’clock
and then simply allowed Ms. Pylican to access the facility” for legitimate reasons).) The
district court’s analysis of innocent explanations for Pylican’s conduct was not consistent
with applicable legal standards.
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The district court next reasoned that the evidence was insufficient to show
reasonable suspicion that any sort of theft may have been going on because there was no
evidence the people inside two hours after closing “broke in” or were “moving anything
from any storage units.” (3/22/18 Tr., p. 15, L. 7 – p. 16, L. 15.) However, the district
court’s requirement of catching someone in the act of the suspected crime is also contrary
to the applicable legal standard. In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968), an officer saw
two men conferring on a street corner, then take turns walking up the street to a store 300
to 400 feet away and looking in a window before returning to the corner, something that
both men did five or six times. Terry, 392 U.S. at 5-6. In addressing Terry the Court later
stated:
Even in Terry, the conduct justifying the stop was ambiguous and
susceptible of an innocent explanation. The officer observed two
individuals pacing back and forth in front of a store, peering into the
window and periodically conferring. All of this conduct was by itself
lawful, but it also suggested that the individuals were casing the store for a
planned robbery. Terry recognized that the officers could detain the
individuals to resolve the ambiguity.
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000) (citations omitted). That Deputy Geisel did
not witness an actual crime does not show an absence of reasonable suspicion.
The presence of several people with two vehicles, including a truck, in a storage
facility two hours after that business had closed, and when even a customer of the facility
should not have been able to get access through the gate, provided reasonable suspicion
that Pylican and the others may have been engaged in theft or burglary. That Pylican may
not be engaged in such activities, but instead be a patron of the facility moving her own
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property at midnight, two hours after the facility closed, 1 did not disprove reasonable
suspicion. An investigative stop to ascertain the legitimacy and legality of their activity did
not violate her rights against unreasonable seizure.

II.
Deputy Geisel Did Not Unreasonably Expand The Scope Of The Stop By Having Pylican
Exit The Car
A.

Introduction
The district court also suppressed on the basis that ordering Pylican out of the car

was an “independent” constitutional violation. (3/22/18 Tr., p. 21, L. 10 – p. 28, L. 8.)
This conclusion also is contrary to established applicable constitutional standards.

B.

Standard Of Review
This Court reviews suppression motion orders with a bifurcated standard. State v.

Wulff, 157 Idaho 416, 418, 337 P.3d 575, 577 (2014). When a decision on a motion to
suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the trial court’s findings of fact that are

1

The district court also concluded that Deputy Geisel’s disbelief of Pylican’s statement
about being in the storage facility before it closed, because he witnessed her enter about
two hours after it closed, was unreasonable. (3/22/18 Tr., p. 19, L. 20 – p. 21, L. 9.) This
conclusion is also not supported by the legal standards set forth above. After Pylican stated
that she could not use her codes to access the facility after hours, Deputy Geisel asked,
“How did you get in?” and Pylican responded, “We were there before ten.” (State’s Exhibit
2 at 00:50-01:18.) This statement is facially inconsistent with Deputy Geisel’s
observations of the Mazda entering the storage facility about two hours after closing. The
district court merely assumes, without evidence, that Pylican was present before closing
but then left and came back. While that is not impossible, the officer was under no
obligation to reach the most innocent conclusion from the information he had, and the
district court erred by doing so. It was reasonable for Deputy Geisel to conclude that
Pylican was lying about when she entered the storage facility based on his observations.
More importantly, it was reasonable for Deputy Geisel to continue his investigation into
whether Pylican’s explanation of her activities was true.
8

not clearly erroneous, but freely reviews the application of constitutional principles to those
facts. Id.

C.

An Order To Exit A Car During A Lawful Traffic Stop Does Not Violate The
Fourth Amendment
“[O]nce a motor vehicle has been lawfully detained for a traffic violation, the police

officers may order the driver to get out of the vehicle without violating the Fourth
Amendment’s proscription of unreasonable searches and seizures.”

Pennsylvania v.

Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 n.6 (1977). See also Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 406
(1978) (“In [Mimms] we held that once a motor vehicle had been lawfully detained for a
traffic violation, police officers could constitutionally order the driver out of the vehicle.”);
Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 331 (2009) (characterizing the quoted language above
as the Court’s holding). The officer may order the occupants from the car even without
reasonable suspicion they pose a safety risk. Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 258
(2007). See also New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 115 (1986) (police may order occupants
from a stopped vehicle “even though they lack any particularized reason for believing the
driver possesses a weapon”). Indeed, an order to exit a lawfully stopped car may be issued
“as a matter of course.” Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 410 (1997). Finally, the
officer’s subjective intentions in ordering the occupants from the car are irrelevant to this
inquiry. Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 38 (1996) (citing Whren v. United States, 517
U.S. 806, 813 (1996)).
The order to exit the Mazda did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Deputy Geisel
did not need any particularized reason to believe that Pylican or her passenger posed a
safety risk, but could issue the order as a matter of course. Thus, Deputy Geisel “was
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objectively justified in asking [Pylican] to get out of the car, subjective thoughts
notwithstanding.” Robinette, 519 U.S. at 38.
The district court concluded that the Supreme Court of the United States upended
all of the above decisions in Rodriguez v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 1609,
1615-16 (2015). (3/22/18 Tr., p. 21, L. 19 – p. 23, L. 16.) The district court’s conclusion
does not withstand scrutiny.
In Rodriguez, the lower court held that a delay of seven or eight minutes for the
drug dog to arrive after the traffic stop was concluded was “an acceptable ‘de minimis
intrusion on Rodriguez’s personal liberty.’” Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1614 (quoting 741
F.3d 905, 908 (8th Cir. 2014)). In doing so, the lower court relied heavily on Mimms. Id.
at 1615. “In Mimms, we reasoned that the government’s ‘legitimate and weighty’ interest
in officer safety outweighs the ‘de minimis’ additional intrusion of requiring a driver,
already lawfully stopped, to exit the vehicle.” Id. at 1615 (citation omitted). The lower
court wrongly concluded this analysis applied to a de minimis extension of the stop,
however, as follows:
Unlike a general interest in criminal enforcement, however, the
government’s officer safety interest stems from the mission of the stop
itself. Traffic stops are “especially fraught with danger to police officers,”
Johnson, 555 U.S., at 330, 129 S.Ct. 781 (internal quotation marks omitted),
so an officer may need to take certain negligibly burdensome precautions in
order to complete his mission safely. Cf. United States v. Holt, 264 F.3d
1215, 1221-1222 (C.A.10 2001) (en banc) (recognizing officer safety
justification for criminal record and outstanding warrant checks), abrogated
on other grounds as recognized in United States v. Stewart, 473 F.3d 1265,
1269 (C.A.10 2007). On-scene investigation into other crimes, however,
detours from that mission. See supra, at 1615. So too do safety precautions
taken in order to facilitate such detours. But cf. post, at 1624 – 1625
(ALITO, J., dissenting). Thus, even assuming that the imposition here was
no more intrusive than the exit order in Mimms, the dog sniff could not be
justified on the same basis. Highway and officer safety are interests
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different in kind from the Government’s endeavor to detect crime in general
or drug trafficking in particular.
Id. at 1616 (emphasis added 2).
This language does not abrogate the standard, set forth above in cases spanning
decades, that it does not violate the Fourth Amendment for an officer to order occupants
from the car as a matter of course during an otherwise legal traffic stop, with or without
suspicion of risk and regardless of the officer’s subjective intent. Ordering Pylican and her
passenger from the car during the course of the traffic stop (as opposed to after the purposes
of the stop were concluded) was not objectively unreasonable. The presence and use of
the drug dog did not render the deputy’s actions unreasonable.
It is well established law that an officer can order an occupant from a stopped car.
Deputy Geisel did not violate Pylican’s rights by ordering her from the car during the
course of the investigative detention.

2

The highlighted sentence is directed at Justice Alito’s dissent, in which he pointed out
that the officer could have conducted the drug dog sniff prior to giving the verbal warning
on the traffic infraction, but delayed doing so only so backup could arrive, which he argued
was a constitutionally reasonable safety decision. Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1624-25. The
highlighted sentence therefore stands only for the proposition that safety concerns did not
justify holding Rodriguez past the issuance of the warning in order to conduct the dog sniff,
and not a wide-spread repudiation of the holding of Mimms and the subsequent cases
applying it.
11

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to reverse the district court’s order
granting suppression.
DATED this 11th day of October, 2018.

/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
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